Abstract-Intellectual property protection of multimedia content is essential to the successful deployment of Internet content delivery platforms. There are two general approaches to multimedia copy protection: copy prevention and copy detection. Past experience shows that only copy detection based on mark embedding techniques looks promising. Multimedia fingerprinting means embedding a different buyer-identifying mark in each copy of the multimedia content being sold. Fingerprinting is subject to collusion attacks: a coalition of buyers collude and follow some strategy to mix their copies with the aim of obtaining a mixture from which none of their identifying marks can be retrieved; if their strategy is successful, the colluders can redistribute the mixture with impunity. A construction is presented in this paper to obtain fingerprinting codes for copyright protection which survive any collusion strategy involving up to three buyers (3-security). It is shown that the proposed scheme achieves 3-security with a codeword length dramatically shorter than the one required by the general Boneh-Shaw construction. Thus the proposed fingerprints require much less embedding capacity. Due to their own clandestine nature, collusions tend to involve a small number of buyers, so that there is plenty of use for codes providing cost-effective protection against collusions of size up to three.
I. INTRODUCTION
If multimedia content delivery services are to take off over the Internet, delivery platforms should guarantee intellectual property protection. There are two general approaches to protecting the copyright of multimedia content: one is a priori and consists of trying to prevent illegal copies from being made; the other is a posteriori, i.e. it tries to detect illegal copying once it has taken place. In view of the past experience in failure of copy prevention systems (the most recent being the DVD copy prevention failure, see [3] ), only copy detection seems to have reasonable chances of success. Copy detection is based on mark embedding: the merchant embeds an imperceptible mark into the content before selling it [5] . There are two kinds of mark: watermarks and fingerprints. A watermark is a message that allows ownership of the marked content to be proven, whereas a fingerprint allows buyer identification [7] . Thus, fingerprints can be used to trace illegal redistributors: once a redistributed copy is found, the buyer who legally purchased it can be identified, and this legal buyer is necessarily the (first) illegal redistributor.
Collusion attacks are not an issue for watermarking (all marked copies being identical), but should be considered in the case of fingerprinting. In a collusion attack, a coalition of dishonest buyers compare their copies in order to locate differences between them and follow a strategy to fabricate a new copy of the content whose mark is either no longer recoverable or does not allow identification of any of the colluders. If the collusion strategy is successful, the fabricated content can be redistributed with impunity.
In [1] and [2] , the concept of fingerprinting secure against buyer collusions is introduced. A general construction is given to obtain fingerprinting codes secure against collusions of up to c buyers (c-secure codes). For N possible buyers and given > 0, L = 2c log(2N=) and d = 8c 2 log(8cL=) a code with N codewords of length l = 2Ldc = 32c 4 log 2N log 8cL (1) is constructed which allows one of the colluders to be identified with probability 1 0 (the fingerprint embedded in each copy sold is a different codeword of the fingerprinting code). The authors also show that, for c 2 and N 3, it is not possible to obtain c-secure codes where colluders are identified with probability 1.
In [4] it is shown that, for c = 2, collusion security can be obtained using the error-correcting capacity of dual Hamming codes. In this way, 2-secure fingerprinting codes are obtained which are much shorter than 2-secure codes obtained via the general construction [1] , [2] . There are two advantages in using a shorter fingerprinting code: 1) embedding a fingerprint requires less embedding capacity (in other words, it is more imperceptible); 2) since less bits must be embedded and retrieved, the embedding and retrieval of fingerprints is more cost-effective.
We show in this paper that, for c = 3, it is also possible to come up with collusion-secure fingerprinting codes much shorter than 3-secure codes obtained from the general construction [1] , [2] . The basic idea is to compose a new kind of code, which we call scattering code, with a dual Hamming code.
Section II contains an overview of our proposal. Section III presents some results on dual Hamming codes. Section IV presents a set of lemmas on the probability of successful collusion as a function of the strategy of colluders. The construction and decoding of scattering codes are introduced in Section V. Section VI explains how to generate fingerprinting codes secure against collusions of up to three buyers by composing a scattering code with a dual Hamming code. Section VII concludes by presenting some numerical results. Finally, the Appendix contains proofs for all but two lemmas presented in the paper (the two omitted proofs are nearly trivial).
II. OVERVIEW
Binary dual Hamming codes can be used to build fingerprints resistant against collusions of up to three buyers in the way proposed in this 1094-6977/03$17.00 © 2003 IEEE paper. A different codeword of such a code is assigned to each buyer as fingerprint; to recover the fingerprint, minimum distance decoding is used. Thus, colluders succeed if they manage to mix their copies to obtain a copy containing an embedded word such that the closest codeword to that word is a codeword assigned as a fingerprint to a buyer different from the colluders.
We model collusion attacks as so-called "p-majority" strategies. In such a strategy, three colluders wishing to mix their copies choose, for the positions where their codewords differ, the majority bit with probability p. We prove in this paper that, if the colluders follow a p-majority strategy with p close to one, the probability of identifying the three of them can be made arbitrarily close to one with the sole use of codewords of a binary dual Hamming code as fingerprints.
The problem is that p is a parameter chosen by the colluders, so they are likely to use the best choice for them, which is p = 0 (in fact a small p is enough for them to stay undetected with great probability).
To remedy this, we propose to construct fingerprints by composing a special new kind of codes, called scattering codes and described in this paper, with dual binary Hamming codes. With such a composition, the merchant can make sure that, regardless of the p-majority strategy used by colluders to mix their composed codewords, the result of decoding the mixed composed codeword will be a word generated by a p(v)-majority strategy, where the probability p(v) is controlled by the merchant and can be made arbitrarily close to one. Thus, the probability that the three colluders can be identified can be made arbitrarily close to one by our construction.
III. DUAL BINARY HAMMING CODES
The dual code of a binary Hamming code (denoted by DH (n)) is a binary code with 2 n codewords of length N = 2 n 0 1 such that the distance between any two codewords is 2 n01 . A few definitions and useful properties related to such codes are presented next. 
IV. 3-COLLUSIONS OVER DH (n)

A. Detectable Positions
Let us assume that three dishonest buyers c 1 , c 2 , c 3 compare their copies of the same multimedia content. According to the marking assumption [1] , they can only modify the embedded marks in those detectable positions, i.e., those where not all three marks take the same bit value. In those positions, the colluders can set the corresponding bit to "0," "1," or "unreadable." In this way, we conclude that, if three different buyers are assigned codewords a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 of a DH (n) code, the result of their collusion will be a word a coll where no bit has been modified in the can be identified as well.
B. Decoding by Minimum Distance
As said above, colluders can generate a new object whose embedded codeword may have been altered in detectable positions. In this way, it is possible that the word retrieved from a collusion-generated object does not correspond to any DH (n) codeword. In these situations, the recovered word will be error-corrected by minimum distance.
Thus, in order for a collusion to be successful g (see Fig. 1 ). In this way, another buyer will be accused in lieu of the colluders. Note that we are assuming colluders do not generate "unreadable" positions when colluding over DH (n) codewords. It will be shown later that our construction actually prevents unreadable positions from being fed by colluders to the dual Hamming decoder.
C. Objective of Colluders
As decoding is done by minimum distance, the objective of colluders is to come up with an object whose embedded word is as distant as possible from their assigned codewords.
Intuitively, it can be realized that all colluders must contribute the same number of bits from their corresponding codewords. Otherwise, the collusion-generated word would be closer to the codewords of those colluders having contributed more bits.
Definition 3: A p-majority collusion strategy is one in which colluders choose with probability p the majority bit value in positions minor(a i ; a j ; a k ) (that is, the bit values in a j or a k ) (See Fig. 2 ). It can be seen that a word generated using a p-majority strategy on 
D. Distance From a Collusion-Generated Word to Colluders' Codewords
Lemma 3: Let a coll be a word that has been generated using a p-majority collusion strategy between three codewords where b(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) is the binomial probability function (x 2 is the number of trials, x3 the success probability per trial and x1 is the number of successful trials).
Remarks: The total number of differing bits is the addition of two binomial random variables. We use this fact to compute its expected value as (6) As can be seen in Table I 
Lemma 5: Let a coll be a word generated using a p-majority collusion strategy between three codewords a See Table III for a numerical example of d6:
As can be seen in Fig. 3 , when p > 0:6, d 2 tends to take smaller values than d 6 . This means that, with high probability, the codeword in DH(n) nearest to the collusion-generated word is a colluder codeword.
F. Identifying Colluders' Codewords
Lemma 9: Let a coll be a word generated using a p-majority strategy (p > 0:6) between three codewords a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 2 DH(n). The probability that the codeword in DH(n) nearest to a coll is not in fa   1 ; a 2 ; a 3 g is expressed by
is the probability that decoding a coll yields as a result a codeword different from any of the colluders' codewords, that is, the probability of an honest buyer being unjustly accused instead of the colluders. The formula above for is straightforward from the definitions of d 2 and d 6 , so its proof is omitted in the Appendix.
Remarks: It can be observed from Table IV that, as n increases and p approaches 1, the probability of accusing an innocent buyer can be made arbitrarily close to 0.
The following result follows from the definitions of d 3 and d 6 , so its proof is omitted in the Appendix as well.
Lemma 10: Let a coll be a word generated using a p-majority strategy (p > 0:6) between three codewords a Remarks: It can be observed from Table V that as n increases and p approaches 1, the probability of not identifying all three colluders can be made arbitrarily close to 0.
The problem is that the parameter p defining the collusion strategy is chosen by the colluders, which Implies they can take p = 0 to make sure they are not identified! In Section V, a new kind of codes named scattering codes are presented. These codes are used in Section VI to prevent colluders from avoiding identification in this way.
V. SCATTERING CODES
A. Construction
A scattering code SC (d; t) with parameters (d; t) can be defined as a binary code consisting of 2t codewords of length (2t + 1)d constructed as follows.
1) Construction starts with generation of SC (1; t).
a) i-th codeword for 1 i t is constructed by setting the first and the (i + 1)-th bits of the codeword to "1." The remaining bits are set to "0." b) i-th codeword for t + 1 i 2t is constructed by setting the (i + 1)-th bit of the codeword to "1." The remaining bits are set to "0." 2) Code SC (d; t) is generated by replicating d times every column of SC (1; t). Define a block to be a group of d replicated columns. 3) By convention, the first t codewords of SC (d; t) are defined to encode a "1" and the last t codewords are defined to encode a "0". The first block of the code is called "Zone-A," the next t blocks are called "Zone-B" and the last t blocks are called "Zone-C." Using a Scattering Code, a "1" is encoded by randomly choosing one of the first t codewords and a "0" is encoded by randomly choosing one of the last t codewords (Table VI shows the codewords of a SC (2; 3) code).
B. Decoding
A scattering code is decoded by using the first applicable rule among the following ordered list.
1) If all bits in "Zone-A" are "1" and all bits in "Zone-C" are "0," decode as "1." 2) If all bits in "Zone-A" are "0" and all bits in "Zone-B" are "0," decode as "0." 3) If in two blocks of "Zone-B" there is at least one bit in each with value "1," decode as "1." 4) If in two blocks of "Zone-C" there is at least one bit in each with value "1," decode as "0." 5) If there are more "1" bits than "0" bits in "Zone-A," decode as "1." 6) If there are more "0" bits than "1" bits in "Zone-A," decode as "0." 7) Decode as "Unreadable" Note: It is easy to see that an odd value for d makes Rule 7 unreachable, thus causing a "0" or "1" to be always returned.
Lemma 11: Let b coll be a word generated by using a p-majority strategy between three codewords b 1 Then, the probability that b coll decodes as v is given by See Fig. 4 for a plot of p(v) as a function of p for different scattering codes.
VI. 3-SECURE CODES
A. Construction
For N = 2 n buyers, each buyer c i is assigned a different codeword The merchant then permutes the bits in A i using a pseudo-random permutation seeded by a secret key known only to the merchant. The same permutation is applied to all codewords. A i . Fig. 5 graphically depicts the construction described in this section. Finally, the merchant embeds the permuted version of A i in the content being sold.
B. Three-Collusions
Let us suppose three dishonest buyers Table VII, Table VIII, Table IX and Fig. 5 ). It can be seen from Table IV that Controlling p(v) is necessary to the keep low the probability of successful collusion. If A i has some bits with value 'Unreadable', those bits are randomly set to "0" or "1."
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Once parameters d and t have been fixed, the number of buyers can be increased by increasing n. For d = 5 and t = 5, Table X shows the size of the code (number of buyers), the codeword length of our proposal, the probability of a successful collusion and the codeword length of Boneh-Shaw's proposal for the same n and .
It can be seen that Boneh-Shaw's construction results in much longer codewords than our proposal. Further, as n increases, their codeword length increases faster than ours. In our proposal, once d and t have been fixed, the value decreases exponentially as n increases, which yields security levels higher than needed. Thus, a better comparison is to use a fixed and assume that, for our security requirements, 8 0 < one has 0 0. We take a value = 10 010 and use it as security level for Boneh-Shaw's construction.
Results are presented in Table XI .
For a fixed = 10 010 , we can observe that our proposal yields shorter codeword lengths up to n = 16 (number of buyers is 65 536). For values of n > 16 Boneh-Shaw's proposal offers a shorter codeword length. The explanation is that our codeword length increases as O(N ), while Boneh-Shaw's increases as O(log N ) with a large constant factor; this large constant factor prevents Boneh-Shaw's scheme from comparing favorably unless N is very large. From the expressions at the bottom of the page we build the following equation system: therefore, the probability of there being k 0t differing bits in those positions is given by a binomial probability function b(k0t; 2 n01 ; 10p). In this way, the expression in the Lemma corresponds to the probability of there being a total of t + (k 0 t) = k differing bits between a 1 and a coll .
APPENDIX PROOF of LEMMAS
Proof: (Lemma 4):
The expression in the Lemma corresponds to the probability of one, two or three codewords in fa 1 has all 2 n03 bits each of which is different with p and 2 n03 bits each of which is different with probability (1 0 p). Therefore, we have 3 1 2 n03 bits with probability p of being different, and thus the probability that t of such bits are different is b(t; 3 1 2 n03
; p). On the other hand, we have 3 1 2 n03 bits with probability 1 0 p of being different, and thus the probability that k 0 t of such bits are different is b(k 0 t; 3 1 2 n03 ; 1 0 p). In this way, the expression in the Lemma computes the probability of there being t + (k 0 t) = k different bits between a and a coll .
Proof: (Lemma 8):
The expression in the Lemma computes the probability that at least one out of the 2 n 0 3 codewords in , where p dif (v) corresponds to the probability of decoding v after a collusion based on a p-majority strategy. p dif (v) is actually the probability of decoding using Rules 2 or 6. -Rule 2 will be applied if all bits in "Zone-A" and "Zone-B" are "0." Since we are assuming a p-majority strategy, all bits in "Zone-A" will be "0" with probability b(d; d; 1 0 p) = (1 0 p) d , because the majority bit in these positions is "1." Since b1 6 = b2, there will be two detectable blocks in "Zone-B" where the majority bit is "0." Bits in "Zone-B" will be all "0" with probability b(2d; 2d; p) = p 2d . So the probability of applying Rule 2 is (1 0 p) d p 2d .
Since only one out of the three colluding codewords has value "0," it is not possible to have more than one block of "Zone-C" with bit values different from "0." So Rule 4 cannot be applied. -
The next possibility for decoding as "0" is to apply Rule 6. This happens if there are more "0" bits than "1" bits in "Zone-A" and no other rule between 1 and 5 has been applied before. In order to render Rule 3 not applicable, we need one of the two detectable blocks of "Zone-B" to be all zeros. Let us assume it is the leftmost one. This happens with probability b(d; d; p) = p d . Then we need more than half of the d bits of "Zone-A" with value "0" (or less than one half with value "1"), which happens with probability bd01=2c k=0 b(k; d; p). We also need that one of the two detectable blocks of "Zone-B" is all zeros (which happens with probability p d ) and the other with at least one "1" bit (which causes Rule 2 not to be applied and happens with probability 1 0 b(d; d; p) = 1 0 p d ).
As this can happen twice, one with each of the blocks of 'Zone-B' forced to have all bits to "0," the total probability is 2 1 p d (1 0 p d ) bd01=2c k=0 b(k; d; p). The same rule is also applied if both blocks of "Zone-B" have all bits to "0" (with probability p 2d ) and the number of "1" bits in "Zone-A" is greater than 0 (to make Rule 2 not applicable) and less than than one half of the block length d. The total probability is b) In the case b 1 = b 2 , the probability of decoding value "1" corresponds to the probability of decoding after applying Rule 1 or Rule 5 (note that Rule 3 is not applicable).
Rule 1 will be applied if all bits in "Zone-A" are "1" and all bits in "Zone-C" are "0." In both cases, we need all bits to take the majority value, which happens with probability b(2d; 2d; p) = p 2d .
The other possibility is to apply Rule 5 conditioned to not having applied Rule 1 before. There are two possible scenarios.
In the first scenario, we need at least one bit of "Zone-C" and more than one half of the bits of "Zone-A" with value "1." This happens with probability In the other scenario, we need all bits of "Zone-C" to be "0" and the number of ones in "Zone-A" to be more than a half of the zone but less than d (otherwise Rule 1 would have been applied before). This happens with probability 
